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    <title>Binary-Security on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Binary-Security on ShieldedBytes</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:46:34 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>When a Third‑Party Binary Gets Stuck in Your CI Pipeline: Spotting and Removing Malicious Artifacts Before Deployment</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-11-when-a-thirdparty-binary-gets-stuck-in-your-c/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:46:34 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-11-when-a-thirdparty-binary-gets-stuck-in-your-c/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h3 id=&#34;why-the-problem-matters&#34;&gt;Why the problem matters&lt;/h3&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Modern CI/CD pipelines are a buffet of binaries pulled from package registries, container registries, or vendor sites. One bad apple can slip through, get signed, and end up in production. The 2025 “Supply‑Chain Attack” wave showed that attackers are hitting build tooling hard, not just the app code. If a malicious binary hides inside a Docker image or a shared library, it can survive across environments, dodge runtime defenses, and give attackers a foothold for lateral movement.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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