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    <title>Devops on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Devops on ShieldedBytes</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:30:34 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>When Your CI Pipeline Ignores Artifact Signatures: How to Enforce GPG Checks Before Deploying to Production</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-10-when-your-ci-pipeline-ignores-artifact-signat/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:30:34 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-10-when-your-ci-pipeline-ignores-artifact-signat/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;why-a-missing-gpg-check-is-a-silent-vulnerability&#34;&gt;Why a Missing GPG Check is a Silent Vulnerability&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;When a CI pipeline builds a Docker image, compiles a binary, or packages a Helm chart, it usually writes the result to an artifact store. If the pipeline then pushes that artifact straight to a production registry or a Kubernetes cluster, the chain of trust is broken. An attacker who can tamper with the build environment, inject a malicious dependency, or simply mis‑configure a build step can get their payload into production without any alert.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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