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    <title>Key-Management on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Key-Management on ShieldedBytes</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 09:30:34 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>How to Spot and Block Unauthorized Package Signing in Your CI/CD Pipeline</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-09-how-to-spot-and-block-unauthorized-package-si/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 09:30:34 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-09-how-to-spot-and-block-unauthorized-package-si/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-threat-of-rogue-package-signatures&#34;&gt;The threat of rogue package signatures&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;When a CI/CD pipeline pulls a dependency, it assumes the artifact came from a trusted source. In 2025, several high‑profile supply‑chain incidents showed that attackers can replace a legitimate package with a malicious one that carries a valid signature. The signature itself is not the problem; it is the trust anchor that the pipeline uses to verify it. If that anchor is compromised or misconfigured, the entire build chain can be subverted.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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