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    <title>Serverless on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Serverless on ShieldedBytes</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 11:38:33 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Hardening Serverless IAM: Least Privilege for AWS Lambda Execution Roles</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-21-hardening-serverless-iam-least-privilege-for-/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 11:38:33 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-21-hardening-serverless-iam-least-privilege-for-/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When a Lambda function boots, it picks up an IAM role that tells it what it can talk to. A lot of teams just slap &lt;strong&gt;AdministratorAccess&lt;/strong&gt; or &lt;strong&gt;AWSLambdaFullAccess&lt;/strong&gt; on those roles to keep the dev cycle painless. The problem? That opens the whole box up for an attacker or a typo in the code. Below is a hands‑on playbook I’ve used in production to tighten those roles, with real commands, a few trade‑offs, and the things that usually trip people up.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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