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    <title>Threat-Modeling on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:12:34 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Using Attack Trees to Prioritize API Rate‑Limiting Controls After a Recent DDoS Event</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-13-using-attack-trees-to-prioritize-api-ratelimi/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:12:34 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-11-13-using-attack-trees-to-prioritize-api-ratelimi/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;attacktreedriven-ratelimiting-after-a-ddos&#34;&gt;Attack‑Tree‑Driven Rate‑Limiting After a DDoS&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;We just survived a 2026 DDoS that hammered our public REST gateway. A botnet slammed a handful of endpoints with insane request rates, chewing through CPU and memory until real users hit time‑outs. The fallout was a frantic review of our throttling logic. Attack trees turned out to be the perfect tool to decide &lt;em&gt;which&lt;/em&gt; endpoints need the tightest controls and &lt;em&gt;how&lt;/em&gt; to enforce them without turning our API into a brick wall.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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