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    <title>Tmpfs on ShieldedBytes</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Tmpfs on ShieldedBytes</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 08:48:30 +0200</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>Denying write access on /tmp: a quick fix to stop local privilege escalation</title>
      <link>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-09-06-denying-write-access-on-tmp-a-quick-fix-to-st/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 08:48:30 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://linuxeries.org/post/2026-09-06-denying-write-access-on-tmp-a-quick-fix-to-st/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;why-tmp-is-a-problem&#34;&gt;Why /tmp is a problem&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;/tmp&lt;/code&gt; is the classic “dump‑ground” for most Linux programs.&lt;br&gt;&#xA;Because it’s world‑writable, a non‑root user can drop a rogue binary, swap out a shared library, or trick a set‑uid helper into loading code from there.&lt;br&gt;&#xA;In 2025 a handful of local privilege‑elevation bugs (e.g., CVE‑2025‑1234) took advantage of that writable surface to inject payloads into privileged processes.&lt;br&gt;&#xA;The fix? Make &lt;code&gt;/tmp&lt;/code&gt; read‑only for everyone but root.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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